






Seminar Paper No. 738 
HOW IMPORTANT ARE FINANCIAL FRICTIONS 



























   INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC STUDIES 










Seminar Paper No. 738 
 



























Papers in the seminar series are published on the internet  
in Adobe Acrobat (PDF) format. 
Download from http://www.iies.su.se/ 
 
Seminar Papers are preliminary material circulated to  
stimulate discussion and critical comment. 
 
August 2005 
Institute for International Economic Studies 
Stockholm University 
S-106 91 Stockholm 
Sweden How Important are Financial Frictions in the




This paper aims to evaluate the importance of frictions in credit mar-
kets for business cycles in the U.S. and the Euro area. For this purpose,
I modify the DSGE ￿nancial accelerator model developed by Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and estimate it using Bayesian methods. The
model is augmented with frictions such as price indexation to past in￿ a-
tion, sticky wages, consumption habits and variable capital utilization.
My results indicate that ￿nancial frictions are relevant in both areas. Us-
ing the Bayes factor as criterion, the data favors the model with ￿nancial
frictions both in the U.S. and the Euro area in ￿ve di⁄erent speci￿cations
of the model. Moreover, the size of the ￿nancial frictions is larger in the
Euro area.
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11 Introduction
The works of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), where endogenous procyclical movements in entrepreneurial net worth
magnify investment and output ￿ uctuations, constitute the corner stone of
most recent theoretical papers with ￿nancial frictions.1 Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1996) develop the so-called ￿nancial accelerator, a mechanism based
on information asymmetries between lenders and entrepreneurs that creates
ine¢ ciencies in ￿nancial markets, which a⁄ect the supply of credit and am-
plify business cycles. Speci￿cally, during booms (recessions), an increase (fall)
in borrowers￿net worth decreases (increases) the borrowers￿cost of obtaining
external funds, which further stimulates (destimulates) investment amplifying
the e⁄ects of the initial shock. The ￿nancial accelerator approach has become
widely spread in the literature and many studies have introduced these types of
frictions in DSGE models (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), henceforth
BGG; Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004)). The same idea has been used in
growth models (Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004), Aghion, Howitt, and
Mayer-Foulkes (2003)) as well as in open economy models (Gertler, Gilchrist,
and Natalucci (2003), Gilchrist, Hairault, and Kempf (2002)).
Despite the ample theoretical work based on the ￿nancial accelerator, lit-
tle has been done when it comes to the econometric estimation of these models.
I only know of four papers estimating closed economy models with a ￿nancial
accelerator. Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004) estimate a DSGE model
with a ￿nancial accelerator but they ￿x the parameters related to the ￿nancial
frictions and use the same calibration as in BGG. They ask which shocks had
a more important role in the Great Depression and if a di⁄erent monetary pol-
icy could have moderated the crisis. Christensen and Dib (2004) estimate the
standard BGG model for the U.S. using maximum likelihood and ￿nd evidence
in favor of the ￿nancial accelerator model. Meier and Muller (2005) use mini-
mum distance estimation based on impulse responses to estimate a model with
￿nancial accelerator in the U.S., and ￿nd that ￿nancial frictions do not play a
very important role in the model. Levin, Natalucci, and Zakrajsek (2004) use
nonlinear least squares to estimate the structural parameters of a canonical debt
contract model with informational frictions. Using microdata for 900 U.S. ￿rms
over the period 1997Q1 to 2003Q3, they reject the null hypothesis of frictionless
￿nancial markets.
Given the paucity of empirical work on the ￿nancial accelerator, the
purpose of this paper is to answer two basic questions. First, I want to determine
1There exists a large literature emphasizing the role of ￿nancial frictions in business cycles,
see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993).
2if a model with frictions in ￿nancial markets delivers a better description of the
data than a model without such frictions, even if realistic frictions in goods
and labor markets are added to the model. Second, I want to investigate if
the magnitude of ￿nancial frictions is similar in the U.S. and the Euro area.
One motivation for this is the existence of a common perception that ￿nancial
markets are more developed in the U.S., and consequently, more e¢ cient.
To answer these questions, I modify the standard BGG model and es-
timate it using Bayesian methods for U.S. and European data. Speci￿cally,
I extend the BGG model introducing price indexation to past in￿ ation, sticky
wages, consumption habits and variable capital utilization. One bene￿t of using
Bayesian methods is that we can include prior information about the parame-
ters, especially information about structural parameters from microeconomic
studies. Another bene￿t is related to the fact that some parameters have a spe-
ci￿c economic interpretation and a bounded domain, which can be incorporated
in the priors.
The paper contributes to the existing literature in two main respects.
First, it empirically investigates the importance of frictions in credit markets
for business cycles both in the U.S. and the Euro area, and second, it uses
Bayesian methods to estimates a DSGE model with a ￿nancial accelerator.
The results indicate that ￿nancial frictions are relevant in both areas.
Using the so-called Bayes factor as the evaluation criterion, I ￿nd that the data
favors the model with ￿nancial frictions both in the U.S. and the Euro area.
This is true for all ￿ve speci￿cations of the model. Moreover, consistent with
common perceptions, the size of ￿nancial frictions is larger in the Euro area.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe
an alternative to the standard BGG model which incorporates other frictions
to the economy while maintaining the existence of ￿nancial frictions. This
model is going to be our benchmark model. Section 3 presents the estimation
methodology while Section 4 presents the results. In Section 5, I discuss the
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The speci￿cation of the model follows the work of BGG who incorporate
￿nancial market frictions through a ￿nancial accelerator mechanism in a general
equilibrium model. The main idea of the ￿nancial accelerator is that there exits
a negative relationship between the external ￿nancial premium (the di⁄erence
between the cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of funds)
and the net worth of potential borrowers. The intuition is that ￿rms with
3higher leverage (lower capital to net worth ratio) will have a greater probability
of defaulting and will therefore have to pay a higher premium. Since net worth is
procyclical (because of the procyclicality of pro￿ts and asset prices), the external
￿nance premium becomes countercyclical and ampli￿es business cycles through
an accelerator e⁄ect on investment, production and spending.
Moreover, and following the recent literature in DSGE models, I modify
the original BGG model to improve its empirical performance by introducing
a number of alternative real and nominal frictions commonly considered in the
literature. More speci￿cally, I allow for external habit formation in consumption,
variable capital utilization and Calvo prices and wages with full indexation
to previous period in￿ ation. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) show
variable capital utilization and wage stickiness to be fundamental frictions for
explaining in￿ ation inertia and persistent, hump-shaped responses in output
after policy shocks. The other frictions in the model help to account for the
response of other variables such as consumption and investment. Then, I ask
whether ￿nancial frictions are still empirically important.
Overall, the model is most similar to the one in Christiano, Motto, and
Rostagno (2004), but with several di⁄erences. First, I do not include a banking
sector.2 Second, the return on deposits received by households is in real terms,
while in their paper it is nominal, which allows for a ￿ debt de￿ ation￿e⁄ect.
Third, capital is produced with di⁄erent technology functions: I follow BGG by
assuming the existence of adjustment costs in the production of capital, rather
than costs of changing the investment ￿ ow. Fourth, in my model, variable
capital utilization arises because of higher depreciation rates, while in their
model high capital utilization gives rise to higher cost in terms of goods. Last,
I introduce external habit formation in consumption, while Christiano, Motto,
and Rostagno (2004) use internal habits.
There are seven types of agents in the model: households, retailers, whole-
sale sector, capital producers, entrepreneurs, ￿nancial intermediaries and gov-
ernment. The following subsections describe the behavior of these agents.
2.1 Households
Consider a continuum of monopolistically competitive individuals, in-
dexed by j, whose total mass is normalized to unity. In each period, each of
these households maximizes its expected lifetime utility choosing a ￿nal con-
sumption good, c
j
t, nominal bonds, nb
j
t+1, and real deposits held at ￿nancial
2Even if I include ￿nancial intermediaries in my model, Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno
(2004) consider a larger banking sector which manages di⁄erent kinds of deposits and loans,
and requires capital and labor services.
4intermediates, d
j
t+1, which pay a real gross free risk rate rt. Moreover, as in
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), each household supplies di⁄erentiated la-
bor services to the wholesale sector, l
j
t. Households discount the future at a rate
￿:









































￿ tt + divt,
where w
j
t is the nominal wage of household j, pt is the nominal level of prices, tt
are lump sum taxes and divt are dividends received from ownership of ￿rms. ￿t
and ￿t are shocks to consumer preferences for intertemporal consumption and
leisure respectively, which follow AR(1) processes with mean equal to one.
The introduction of external habit formation in consumption mainly helps
to account for the gradual and hump-shaped response of consumption observed
in the data after a monetary policy shock.
Households also supply di⁄erentiated labor services to the wholesale sec-















and ￿t is a wage (net) mark up shock with mean ￿ (the steady state wage mark
up). Firms minimize the cost of hiring a ￿xed amount of total labor given the











Integrating this equation and imposing the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator for labor,
















I assume that households can reset their wages with probability (1 ￿ #)
at each period. Whenever the household is not allowed to reset his wage con-




t￿1, where ￿t￿1 is the gross in￿ ation in
the last period. According to Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), wage
5stickiness plays a crucial role in the performance of the model. The ￿rst-order





































2.2 Final Good Sector
Firms in the ￿nal good sector produce a consumption good, yt, in a per-
fectly competitive market, combining intermediate goods, ys
t. The production
function transforming intermediate goods into ￿nal output is the usual Dixit-













where ￿t ￿ 0 is a mark up shock with mean ￿. Firms take prices as given and
choose ys



















Integrating this equation and imposing the constraint, we can express the ag-














A variety of intermediate inputs are produced by a continuum of monop-
olistically competitive ￿rms indexed by s 2 [0;1]. Each ￿rm hires the services
of capital, ks
t, and labor, ls
t, to face the demand curve for its product. They
rent capital from an entrepreneurial sector, which owns the capital stock.
6Firms produce according to the following production function:
ys





where at is a productivity shock which follows a ￿rst order autoregressive process
with mean one. Firms choose capital and labor to minimize their total costs,










subject to the production function, and where zt is the real rental price of
capital.
Moreover, wholesale ￿rms have market power and can choose prices to
maximize expected pro￿ts with probability 1￿￿ in each period (Calvo, 1983). As
in the case of wages, ￿rms that cannot choose prices index their prices according
to last period￿ s in￿ ation rate: ps
t = ￿t￿1ps
t￿1:
























uc(t) is the stochastic discount factor between periods t
and t+k and st is the real marginal cost. Pro￿ts are distributed to households.
2.4 Capital Producers
As in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004), the physical stock of cap-
ital, e kt (where the t subscript indicates when capital is actually used), is pro-
duced by a continuum of competitive ￿rms indexed by j. Households own these
￿rms and receive any pro￿ts or losses as lump-sum transfers. However, while
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004) assume there to be a cost of chang-
ing the ￿ ow of investment, I follow the more standard literature on investment
adjustment costs, and assume there to exist increasingly marginal adjustment














new capitals goods. Following BGG, I also assume investment decisions to be
determined one period in advance. This assumption helps to account for a grad-
ual response of investment to shocks a⁄ecting the real interest rate, a feature























7where qt+1 is the relative price of capital, and near the steady state ￿ > 0;
￿0(:) > 0, ￿00(:) < 0. I also assume that in steady state, the relative price of
capital is one.
The law of motion of the aggregate capital stock is:





e kt + (1 ￿ ￿(ut))e kt,
where ut is the rate of capital utilization3, ￿(ut) 2 (0;1) is a convex depreciation
function with ￿
0(:) > 0, and ￿
00(:) > 0 around the steady state. I choose the
function ￿(ut) such that ￿(0) = 0, ￿(1) = 1 and in steady state ￿(1) = ￿:4
2.5 Entrepreneurs and Financial Intermediaries
Entrepreneurs own the physical stock of capital, e kt, and provide capital
services, kt. They ￿nance capital purchases both with their own net worth and
debt. Capital services are related to the physical stock of capital by:
kt = ute kt.
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and have ￿nite horizons, being ￿ the prob-
ability of survival to the next period. This assumption rules out the possibility
of entrepreneurs accumulating enough wealth to be fully self-￿nanced: part of
their capital must be ￿nanced through bank loans with a standard debt contract.
At the end of period t, entrepreneurs decide how much to borrow. Then,
at the beginning of period t+1, after observing all the shocks, they choose how
intensely to use their capital.
2.5.1 Optimal Contract
As in BGG, the return on capital depends on both aggregate and idio-
syncratic shocks. The ex post return on capital for entrepreneur i is !i
t+1rk
t+1,
where !i is an i:i:d. lognormal random variable with pdf F(!) and mean one.5
The riskiness of entrepreneurs is determined by the variance of the idiosyncratic
shock, ￿!. The average return of capital in the economy is:
rk
t+1 =
ut+1zt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿(ut+1))qt+1
qt
.
3ut can take any value ￿ 0; where values greater than one mean that there exists over
utilization of capital.
4One example of this kind of function can be ￿(ut) = 1 ￿
1+p
p+exp"ut with p;" > 0. In this
case, ￿(0) = 0, ￿(1) = 1; ￿(1) = 1 ￿
1+p
p+exp" = ￿. However, I focus on a more general case of
functional forms and I estimate ￿00
ss= ￿0
ss.
5As in Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004), I assume that after entrepreneurs purchase




8Entrepreneurs ￿nance their capital stock at the end of period t with their
own net worth at the end of the period, ni






The entrepreneur borrows from a ￿nancial intermediary that obtains its funds
from households, with an opportunity cost equal to the riskless gross rate of
return, rt. In equilibrium, the intermediary holds a pooled, and perfectly safe,
portfolio and the entrepreneurs absorb any aggregate risk.
Following a "costly state veri￿cation" problem of the type analyzed by
Townsend (1979), in which lenders must pay a ￿xed auditing cost to observe
an individual borrower￿ s realized return, BGG assume monitoring costs to be a





8. When ￿ = 0; we are in the special case of
frictionless ￿nancial markets.
The optimal contract will be incentive compatible, characterized by a
schedule of state contingent threshold values of the idiosyncratic shock $i
t+1,
such that for values of the idiosyncratic shock greater than the threshold, the
entrepreneur is able to repay the lender, and for values below the threshold,




Only one-period contracts between borrowers and entrepreneurs are feasible.
Under these assumptions, the optimal contract is chosen to maximize ex-
pected entrepreneurial utility, conditional on the expected return of the lender,
for each possible realization of rk
t+1, being equal to the riskless rate, rt. In Ap-
pendix A, it is shown that the following two ￿rst-order conditions must hold in


















































t+1) is the expected gross share of pro￿ts going to









6The relevant price of capital at the end of period t is qt:
7Levin, Natalucci, and Zakrajsek (2004) estimate ￿ to be time varying.
8The relevant price here is qt since capital price gains are included in rk
t+1.
9For more details, see BGG (1999).
9From this ￿rst ￿rst-order condition, we see that when ￿nancial markets
are frictionless, ￿ = 0; ￿($i
t+1) = 1 and Etrk
t+1 = rt : the ex-ante return on
capital equals the risk free rate when there are no monitoring costs. The second
￿rst-order condition is related to the fact that the ￿nancial intermediary receives
an expected return equal to the opportunity cost of its funds. In this case, the
lender￿ s expected return can simply be expressed as a function of the average
cuto⁄ value of the ￿rm￿ s idiosyncratic shock, $t+1.
Since the entrepreneur is risk neutral, he only cares about the mean return
on his wealth. He guarantees the lender a return that is free of any systematic
risk: conditional on rk
t+1, he o⁄ers a state-contingent contract that guarantees
the lender a return equal in expected value to the riskless rate.
From these two equations, aggregation is straightforward and it can be
shown that capital expenditures by each entrepreneur i are proportional to his
net worth. Aggregate entrepreneurial net worth (in consumption units) at the

















where ￿ is the fraction of entrepreneurs surviving to the next period, and we
are net transfers to entrepreneurs. At each period, a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of new
entrepreneurs enters the market receiving some transfers and the wealth of the
fraction that did not survive is given to the government.
2.5.2 Optimal Capital Utilization Decision
After observing the shocks at the beginning of period t+1, entrepreneurs
decide how intensively to use their capital. Higher capital utilization is costly
because of higher depreciation rates.10 This is an important assumption be-
cause it allows for variable capital utilization, a relevant feature in the data.









Government consumption expenditures, gt, follow a ￿rst order autore-
gressive process. The government ￿nances its expenditures by lump sum taxes,
tt, and nominal bonds, nbt+1.
10This approach has been used by Baxter and Farr (2001), among others.
102.7 Competitive Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium all the above optimality conditions are sat-
is￿ed. In addition, markets clear. The aggregate resource constraint is





Final goods are allocated to consumption, investment, government expenditure
and monitoring costs11. Furthermore, credit markets clear and bt = dt:
Finally, the monetary authority conducts monetary policy by control-
ling the gross nominal interest rate, rn
t . For convenience, I assume a cashless
economy, but the monetary authority can set the interest rate directly in the






t is a monetary policy shock and ￿t+1 is in￿ ation in t + 1.
2.8 The log-linearized model
To solve the model, I loglinearize the equilibrium conditions around their
steady state values. The model can then be written in terms of three blocks
of linear equations where letters with a hat represent log deviations from the
steady state at time t, and letters without a subscript represent the steady state
values of the variables.
2.8.1 Equilibrium conditions



















b yt = b at + ￿b kt + (1 ￿ ￿)b lt, (2.2)
where ￿ is the steady state capital depreciation.
Next, I write the consumption Euler equation, equation (2.3); the arbi-




￿ (1 + h)










11The last term is the loss in monitoring costs associated with defaulting entrepreneurs.
12This is the same notation as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) but a wage
mark up has been introduced and the mark up is in net terms.
11b rn




t￿1 + ￿1 b wr
t + ￿2 b wr
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bw￿#
￿


























































These three equations are derived from the households￿￿rst-order conditions.
￿ is the net wage mark up in steady state; b ￿t is the preference shock, and b ￿t is
the labor supply shock.
The demand for labor and capital in the wholesale sector, where factor
prices are equal to marginal productivity plus real marginal cost, b st, are given
by:
b yt ￿b lt + b st = b wr
t (2.6)
and
b st + b yt ￿ b kt = b zt: (2.7)
A Phillips curve can be derived from the wholesale sector optimization
problem for prices, where (1 ￿ ￿) is the probability of adjusting prices and ￿ is








(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
(1 + ￿)￿
b st+






Capital producers￿optimality condition is:
Etb qt+1 + ’
￿
b it+1 ￿ b e kt+1
￿
= 0. (2.9)









elasticity of the price of capital with respect to the investment-capital ratio.
12The equilibrium conditions of the entrepreneurs are:
Etb rk



























t+1 ￿ b rt) = b e kt+1 + b qt ￿ b nt+1,
(2.11)







b ut+1 + b qt+1. (2.13)
Equations (2.10) and (2.11) are the ￿rst-order conditions of the optimal lending
contract derived in Appendix A.13 Equation (2.12) relates capital services to
the capital stock, while equation (2.13) is the optimality condition for capital
utilization.




rk b zt+1 +
(1 ￿ ￿)
rk b qt+1 ￿ b qt. (2.14)
Equations (2.15) and (2.16) are the law of motion of net worth and capital
respectively:









































e kt+1 = ￿b it + (1 ￿ ￿)e kt ￿ ￿
0(1)b ut. (2.16)
2.8.2 Monetary policy rule
The loglinearized monetary policy rule is:
b rn
t = ￿rb rn
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿r)(￿￿Eb ￿t+1) + (1 ￿ ￿r)(￿yb yt)=4 +b "
r
t. (2.17)
13In the model without ￿nancial frictions, ￿ = 0, and these equations and the law of motion
of net worth are:
Etb rk










t+1 ￿ b rt) = b e kt+1 + b qt ￿ b nt+1,
and








e K ￿ N
N
!
b rt￿1 + b nt
)
:
The ￿rst equation shows that without monitoring costs, the ex-ante risk premium is zero.
132.8.3 Shock Process





b ￿t = "￿
t , (2.19)
b ￿t = "￿
t, (2.20)
b ￿t = ￿￿b ￿t￿1 + "
￿
t, (2.21)
b ￿t = ￿￿b ￿t￿1 + "￿
t, (2.22)




b at = ￿ab at￿1 + "a
t, (2.24)
where "i
t are white noise shocks a⁄ecting the economy.
Equations (2.18)-(2.20) are the monetary policy, price mark up and wage
mark up shocks. I specify these shocks as white noise shocks. The rest of the
shocks in the model, to labor supply, preferences, government spending and
technology follow a ￿rst-order autoregressive process. I choose this speci￿cation
for the shocks to avoid identi￿cation problems.
2.8.4 Solution Method
To solve the model, I use the method described in Sims (2000) and his
matlab code gensys.m. The loglinearized model can be written as
￿0Xt = ￿1Xt￿1 + ￿Vt + ￿￿t,
where Vt is a vector of exogenous random disturbances, and ￿t is a vector of
expectational errors with mean zero.
2.9 The Standard BGG Model
When estimating the model, I start out with the standard BGG model
and then add four frictions not present in that model: price indexation to past
in￿ ation, sticky wages, external habit formation in consumption and variable
capital utilization. I add these frictions cumulatively, one by one. Once all four
frictions have been added, I obtain the benchmark model described earlier in
this section. For each of the ￿ve versions, I estimate the model both with and
without monitoring costs.
14The intention of this exercise is to check the robustness of the results
when other commonly used frictions are included. Moreover, we want to see
which frictions are more relevant to ￿t the data.
To ￿x ideas, I will next describe the four main di⁄erences between the
benchmark model described in this section and the standard BGG model.14
First, in the standard BGG model, ￿rms that are not allowed to reopti-
mize prices do not index their prices to past in￿ ation. Equation (2.8) becomes:
b ￿t = ￿Etb ￿t+1 +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
(1 + ￿)￿
b st +





where in￿ ation does not depend on past in￿ ation as in the benchmark model
and I have added a price mark up shock. I include price indexation in the
benchmark model since this introduces a lagged in￿ ation term component in
in￿ ation which generates in￿ ation inertia, an aspect observed in the data.
Second, in the standard BGG model, wages are ￿ exible, and equation
(2.5) becomes the standard consumer ￿rst-order condition with respect to labor:
b wr
t ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ h)




where I have added the existence of wage mark up shocks.
Third, households do not exhibit external consumption habits, h = 0 and




(b ￿t ￿ Etb ￿t+1) ￿
1
￿
b rt + Etb ct+1.
The introduction of consumption habits mainly helps to account for the gradual
and hump-shaped response of consumption observed in the data.
Fourth, since there is not variable capital utilization, equation (2.13) is
replaced by b ut = 0 and the depreciation rate is constant. Introducing vari-
able capital utilization helps to o⁄set the ￿ uctuations in labor productivity and
a⁄ects the marginal cost, which is re￿ ected in a more gradual response of prices.
The rest of the equations are those presented in Section 2.8.
3 Methodology for Estimation and Model Eval-
uation
The model has a total of 30 free parameters. Seven of these are calibrated
to their steady state values, as they cannot be identi￿ed from the detrended data.
14Another di⁄erence is that in the original BGG model, there are only three shocks a⁄ecting
the economy: monetary policy, government and technology shocks. Moreover, the interest rate
rule only responds to past in￿ation.
15The steady state rate of depreciation of capital ￿ is set equal to 0.025, which
corresponds to an annual rate of depreciation of ten percent. The discount
factor ￿ is set at 0.99, which corresponds to an annual real rate in steady state
of four percent. The steady state share of government spending was set equal to
19.5 percent15. The parameter of the Cobb-Douglas function, ￿, was set equal
to 0.33, while the steady state price mark up, ￿, was set at 20 percent. These
values imply steady state consumption and investment ratios of 60.9 and 19.6
percent in models without ￿nancial frictions16. Moreover, the steady state wage
mark up, ￿, was set equal to ￿ve percent, and the steady state probability of
default, F($), equal to three percent per year, the same value as BGG.
The remaining 23 parameters are estimated using Bayesian procedures.
The advantage of Bayesian estimation relative to maximum likelihood (the only
realistic alternative), is that the solution of the model implies many restrictions
and boundary values for the parameters which are di¢ cult to impose using
maximum likelihood. Besides, using Bayesian methods also makes it possible to
formally incorporate our beliefs about the parameters.
I start by solving the model for an initial set of parameters. Then, the
Kalman Filter is used to calculate the likelihood function of the data (for given
parameters). Combining prior distributions with the likelihood of the data gives
the posterior kernel which is proportional to the posterior density. Since the
posterior distribution is unknown, we use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
simulation methods to conduct inference about the parameters. Some of these
aspects are discussed in the rest of this section.
3.1 Data
The data used for the estimation corresponds to seven variables of the
model: real output, real consumption, real investment, hours worked, nominal
interest rate, in￿ ation and real wages.17 In all the cases, I use quarterly de-
trended data. For the U.S., the data covers the period 1980Q1-2004Q118, while
15Since this number does not include transfers, we can assume the same value for the U.S.
and the Euro area.
16In models with a ￿nancial accelerator, these ratios will also depend on the risk premium.
17I do not include any ￿nancial variables since to compare the model with and the one
without ￿nancial frictions, the ￿rst will present a natural advantage in the case when these
variables are included.
18U.S. data was taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of
Commerce (BEA), the IMF database and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Real output
is measured by real GDP converted into per capita terms dividing by the population aged
above sixteen (P16). Real consumption is real personal consumption expenditures divided
by P16. Real investment is real gross private domestic investment also in per capita terms.
Hours worked are measured by the product of average weekly hours in the private sector times
16for the Euro area, it covers the period 1980Q1-2002Q419.
3.2 Prior Distribution
All prior distributions of the parameters were selected from the normal,
beta, gamma and uniform distributions, depending on the di⁄erent supports
and characteristics of the parameters. The prior distributions are the same for
the U.S. and the Euro area and are shown in Table 1.
Many of the priors are standard and follow the literature (Smets and
Wouters (2004), Adolfson, LasØn, LindØ, and Villani (2004)). The relative risk
aversion coe¢ cient, ￿, has a normal distribution with mode one; the habit per-
sistence parameter, h, has a beta distribution with mode 0.70. The parameters
determining prices and wages follow a beta distribution. The modes of the Calvo
parameters ￿ and #; the probability of not adjusting prices and wages, were set
equal to 0.70, so that, on average, prices and wages adjust every ten months.
Some of the parameters are particular to the way I capture some frictions
in the model. This is the case of the elasticity of the price of capital with respect
to the investment-capital ratio, ’. There is no consensus about this parameter:
BGG set it equal to -0.25 while King and Wolman (1996) use a value of -2
based on estimations of Chirinko (1993). Since there is not enough information
about this parameter, I use a uniform prior distribution between -1 and 0. The
prior for ￿
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0 is a gamma distribution with mode equal to one, following the
calibrations of Baxter and Farr (2001).
Other non standard parameters in the model are those related to the ￿-
the population aged above twenty. The nominal interest rate is the Federal Funds Rate, and
in￿ation is calculated as the di⁄erence of the GDP de￿ator. Real wages are measured by the
average hourly earnings of production workers in real terms. All series were detrended with a
linear trend and in the case of the interest rate, I used the same trend as in￿ation.
19European data was taken from the AWM database of the ECB. Real output is measured
by real GDP converted into per capita terms dividing by the labor force. Real consumption is
real consumption divided by the labor force. Real investment is real gross investment also in
per capita terms. To calculate hours worked, I use data on total employment, and transform
it into hours worked using the same criterion as Smets and Wouters (2003). They assume
that in any period, only a constant fraction of ￿rms, ￿e, is able to adjust employment to its
desired total labor input. This results in the following equation for employment:
b et = ￿b et+1 +
(1 ￿ ￿e)(1 ￿ ￿￿e)
￿e
(b lt ￿ b et);
where b et is total employment. In contrast to them, I do not estimate ￿e, but following their
results and the results in Adolfson, LasØn, LindØ, and Villani (2004), I ￿x it equal to 0.70.
The nominal interest rate is the quarterly short-term interest rate, and in￿ation is calculated
as the di⁄erence of the GDP de￿ator. Real wages are measured by the wage rate de￿ated by
the GDP de￿ator. All series were detrended with a linear trend and in the case of the interest
rate, I used the same trend as in￿ation.
17nancial frictions. Following BGG, the prior for monitoring costs, ￿, was assumed
to be beta distributed with mode equal to 0.12. The fraction of entrepreneurs
surviving to the next period, ￿, has a beta distribution with mode 0.975 which
implies that on average, entrepreneurs live ten years. Finally, the prior for the
steady state external risk premium (the di⁄erence between the cost of funds
raised externally and the opportunity cost of funds), rk ￿ r, was set gamma
distributed with a mode 0.005, which corresponds to an annual two percent risk
premium as in BGG.
The priors for the parameters of the monetary policy rule are based on
the estimates of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) for the post-82 period. The
long run coe¢ cients on in￿ ation and output, ￿￿ and ￿y, are normally distributed
with mode 1.5 and 0.5 respectively. The interest rate smoothing parameter, ￿r,
follows a beta distribution with mode 0.85.
Regarding the shocks a⁄ecting the economy, the autoregressive coe¢ -
cients have a beta distribution with mode 0.85, while the standard deviations
for the shocks follow a gamma distribution with mode 0.01 for the monetary,
technology and government shocks, and 0.10 for the other shocks.
3.3 Posterior Distribution
I ￿rst estimate the mode of the posterior distribution maximizing the
posterior density p(￿ j Y ) with respect to the vector of parameters ￿ and given
the data Y . The objective is to maximize:
logp(￿ j Y ) = logp(Y j ￿) + logp(￿) ￿ logp(Y ),
where p(Y j ￿) is the sample density or likelihood function, p(￿) is the prior
density of the parameters and p(Y ) is the marginal likelihood.
However, since p(Y ) does not depend on ￿, the posterior mode can be
obtained maximizing (Hamilton (1994))20:
logp(￿;Y ) = logp(Y j ￿) + logp(￿):
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation methods are used to
obtain the posterior distribution. This is necessary since it is not possible to
sample the parameters directly from the posterior distribution. The idea behind
MCMC is to draw values of the parameters from an approximate distribution
and then correct these draws to better approximate the posterior distribution.
Starting from an initial arbitrary value of the parameters, the samples are drawn
sequentially, such that each draw will depend on the previous value. The approx-
imate distribution of the parameters is improved at each step of the simulation
20The RHS was maximized using Sims￿code csminwel.
18until it converges to the posterior. The posterior output can then be used to
compute any posterior function of the parameters: impulse responses, moments,
etc.
To perform the simulations, I used the so-called Metropolis-Hasting al-
gorithm, which uses an acceptance/rejection rule to converge to the posterior
distribution. The algorithm samples a proposal vector of parameters ￿ from









. If the new value of the parameters is re-
jected, then ￿l+1 = ￿l. A random walk around the parameter space was used
as the jumping function. In particular, I set q(￿l+1 j ￿l) = N(￿l;c2￿) where
￿ is the inverse of the Hessian computed at the joint posterior mode, and c
is a scale factor set to obtain e¢ cient algorithms21. After the ￿rst round of
simulations, the exercise was instead repeated setting ￿ equal to the estimated
covariance matrix. The purpose when choosing the scale factor was to tune the
acceptance rate around 25 percent as suggested by Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and
Rubin (2004).
To check convergence, I run di⁄erent chains starting from dispersed points.
Each set of estimates is based on two di⁄erent chains starting from the mode of
the posterior plus-minus two standard deviations, with a total of 100 000 draws
in each simulation. Convergence was monitored by comparing the parameters
variation between and within simulated sequences until ￿ within￿variation ap-
proximates ￿ between￿variation. The idea is that only when the distribution of
each sequence is close to that of all sequences mixed together, all draws can be
considered as coming from the same posterior distribution.
To be more speci￿c, consider the between (B) and within (W) sequence






























(￿ij ￿ b ￿:j)2;
where S is the number of sequences and N the number of draws in each sequence.
The marginal posterior variance of each parameter will be a weighted average
of W and B :







21Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2004) argue that within this class of jumping rules,
the most e¢ cient one has the scale coe¢ cient c ￿ 2:4
p
d; where d is the number of parameters
to be estimated.







which declines to 1 as N ! 1. If the potential scale reduction is high, one
should proceed with further simulations to improve inference. This ratio was
computed for all parameters.
Moreover, to avoid the e⁄ect of the starting points and given that even-
tually the distribution converges to the posterior, the ￿rst half of each sequence
was ignored.
3.4 Model Comparison
To compare the performance of di⁄erent models, their marginal data
density must be calculated. Let us label a model with ￿nancial frictions by Mf
and an alternative speci￿cation of the model without ￿nancial frictions by Mn.
The marginal data density for each model will be:
p(Y j Mi) =
Z
p(Y j ￿i;Mi)p(￿i j Mi)d￿i;
where ￿i is a vector of parameters of model i; p(Y j ￿i;Mi) is the sample density
of model i and p(￿i j Mi) is the prior density of the parameters for model i.
The posterior probability for each model will be:






Bayesian model selection is done pairwise, comparing the models in terms
of the posterior odds ratio:
POi;j =
p(Mi j Y )





where the prior odds
p(Mi)
p(Mj) are updated by the Bayes factor, Bij =
p(Y jMi)
p(Y jMj).
Je⁄reys (1961) suggested rules of thumb to interpret the Bayes factor as follows:
Bij < 1 support for Mj
1 < Bij < 3 very slight evidence against Mj
3 < Bij < 10 slight evidence against Mj
10 < Bij < 100 strong evidence against Mj
Bij > 100 decisive evidence against Mj
20One problem with this approach is how to compute the marginal likeli-
hood, which is obtained by integrating the sample density with respect to the
prior distribution. Following Geweke (1999), I use the modi￿ed harmonic mean
to approximate the marginal likelihood. Gelfand and Dey (1994) show that for











p(Y j ￿i;Mi)p(￿i j Mi)
p(￿i j Y;Mi)d￿i = p(Y j Mi)￿1:





as an approximation for the inverse of the marginal density. Following Geweke




posterior mean) and variance b ￿ = N￿1
N X
g=1
(￿g ￿￿)(￿g ￿￿)0. Moreover, to en-
sure that the domain of f is contained in the parameter space, the distribution
is truncated to the region ￿p =
n




is the number of estimated parameters and all parameters subject to restrictions
have been appropriately transformed.
4 Results
I ￿rst present the results for the U.S. and then for the Euro area. To
check the relevance of the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism, I start estimating
the standard BGG model. Then, I add, one at a time, price indexation to past
in￿ ation, sticky wages, consumption habits and variable capital utilization. I
reestimate the parameters of each alternative model with and without ￿nancial
frictions.
4.1 U.S.
4.1.1 Frictions in the U.S.
In Table 2, I report the posterior mean of the parameters and the marginal
data density for alternative models using U.S. data. In all speci￿cations of
the model, the Bayes factor is greater than 100, which is decisive evidence
against the model without a ￿nancial accelerator. This extends the ￿ndings by
Christensen and Dib (2004) who only estimate the standard BGG model with
21maximum likelihood and provide evidence in favor of a ￿nancial accelerator.
In particular, the table shows that the estimated mean of monitoring costs in
the benchmark case is twelve percent. This result is in line with the results
of Levin, Natalucci, and Zakrajsek (2004). Using microdata for 900 U.S. ￿rms
over the period 1997Q1 to 2003Q3, they estimate that time varying monitoring
cost moved between eight and sixteen percent between 1997 and 1999. When
they smooth through a spike in 1998Q4, the average monitoring costs during
this period is close to twelve percent. After the fall of the stock market in 2000,
monitoring costs went up to reach values as high as forty percent, and then
declined again in 2003.
Table 2 also indicates that the size of monitoring costs decreases once we
introduce other frictions to the standard BGG model. In the standard BGG
case, monitoring costs are almost twice as large as in the benchmark model.
The intuition is that high monitoring costs are necessary for the standard BGG
model to capture the dynamics of the data. Once other frictions are introduced,
however, the data does not require such large ￿nancial frictions.
It is important to mention than when we add price indexation and sticky
wages, the data marginal density decreases. This is probably due to the fact
that in both cases I am imposing full indexation to past in￿ ation. Smets and
Wouters (2004) estimate that for the U.S., the mean degree of price and wage
indexation is 0.34 and 0.75 respectively. In the model, I am constraining these
parameters to be equal to unity in order to reduce the number of parameters to
estimate.
4.1.2 Parameter Estimates for the U.S.
I will now only focus on the benchmark model, which includes all the
frictions. Table 1 reports the mean, median and the 5th and 95th percentile
of the posterior distribution of the benchmark model for U.S. data. Plotting
the path of the di⁄erent parameters along the chain, as well as the value of the
posterior likelihood function, we see convergence to a stationary distribution.
Moreover, when I calculate the potential scale reduction as in equation (3.1),
this idea is con￿rmed by the results. The only parameter which presents some
doubts is the variance of the wage mark up shocks, ￿￿. However, relatively
small changes in the value of this parameter does not a⁄ect the properties of
the model since it is multiplied by a very small number in the solution.
The estimated posterior mean of the risk premium in steady state, rk￿r,
implies an annual premium of 2.4 percent, which is in line with the value used
by BGG and Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2004). Together with other
parameters, this value implies that the investment and consumption output
22ratio in steady state are 17 and 63 percent respectively. Moreover, the fraction
of GDP used in bankruptcy costs is around 0.4 percent, and the mean for the
fraction of entrepreneurs who survive, ￿, is 0.99, implying an average duration
of entrepreneurs of 27 years.22
Table 1 indicates that the four autoregressive shocks a⁄ecting the econ-
omy present a high persistence, compared to the priors.
The coe¢ cients describing consumer preferences do not di⁄er substan-
tially from the priors. The mean of risk aversion is 1.1 rather than one as
the prior, and the habit persistence parameter has a posterior mean of 0.60 as
compared to the prior mean of 0.70.
The posterior mean of ￿ implies that prices adjust on average once every
fourteen months. This result implies more ￿ exible prices than Smets and Wouters
(2004). The same occurs with wages, where the average duration of contracts if
estimated at only four months. Both the elasticity of capital price with respect
to the investment capital ratio, ’, and the variable depreciation parameter,
￿
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0, have a similar posterior mean as the prior: -0.47 and 1.02 respectively.
Concerning the coe¢ cients in the Central Bank instrument rule, all co-
e¢ cients di⁄er from the estimates of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). The
coe¢ cient on future in￿ ation, ￿￿, is higher while the coe¢ cient on output, ￿y,
and the interest rate smoothing parameter, ￿r, are lower.
In the case of the same model but without monitoring costs (no ￿nancial
accelerator), the estimation is robust for most of the parameters. However, the
estimates of two parameters di⁄er considerably. This is the case of the elasticity
of the price of capital, ’, and the entrepreneurs￿ rate of survival, ￿. Both
these parameters are higher in the model with ￿nancial frictions. A possible
explanation is that in a model with ￿nancial accelerator investment reacts more
to shocks, which requires higher adjustment costs to match the dynamics of
investment in the data. This implies that monitoring costs are not relevant
because the model cannot explain investment behavior, but because monitoring
costs help to explain other variables. Moreover, to ensure that self-￿nancing
never occurs, estimates of the probability of survival are lower in a frictionless
credit market model.
To assess the model ￿t, Figure 5 shows the actual and one-side Kalman
￿lter ￿tted data evaluated at the posterior mean for the benchmark model with
and without monitoring costs. The model with ￿nancial frictions seems to bet-
ter ￿t the data, which is in accordance to the Bayes factor criterion. Moreover,
plotting the two-side Kalman ￿lter estimated shocks in ￿gure 6, we see that the
model without ￿nancial accelerator has a weaker propagation mechanism: com-
22These values imply a elasticity of the external ￿nance premium with respect to the leverage
ratio of 0.055, which is in line with the value estimated by Christensen and Dib (2004)
23pared to the model with monitoring costs, larger shocks are needed to explain
the dynamics of the data.
4.2 Euro Area
4.2.1 Frictions in the Euro Area
In Table 3, I report the posterior mean and the marginal data density
for alternative models using European data. Also for European data, the Bayes
factor is greater than 100 in all ￿ve di⁄erent speci￿cations, which clearly favors
a model with monitoring costs. In the benchmark case, the posterior mean of
monitoring costs is 18 percent, ￿fty percent higher than the cost estimated for
the U.S. This number is higher in almost all other speci￿cations of the model,
reaching values as high as 52 percent in the model with price indexation and
sticky wages. Moreover, for each model, the estimated mean of monitoring costs
is higher than in the U.S.
Considering the other frictions in the model, price indexation and variable
capital utilization seem to be the most important ones.23
4.2.2 Parameter Estimates for the Euro Area
Table 1 also reports the mean, median and the 5th and 95th percentile
of the posterior distribution of the benchmark model for European data. The
value of the potential scale reduction indicates some convergence problems for
the parameters governing variable capital depreciation and preference shocks.
However, small changes in the value of these parameters do not a⁄ect the prop-
erties of the model when the impulse response functions are plotted.
The posterior distribution of the parameters using European data is in
general very similar to that of the U.S. This indicates that the shocks driving
the economy and the transmission mechanisms in the two areas are not too
di⁄erent. However, some parameters display more distinct di⁄erences.
The fact that monitoring costs are larger in the Euro area drives up the
external risk premium: in the Euro area, the posterior mean of the annual
risk premium is 3.6 percent in steady state. This implies that in steady state,
the investment and consumption ratio to output are 15.6 and 64.3 percent,
respectively, and that the fraction of GDP used in bankruptcy cost is 0.6 percent.
Concerning the size of the shocks a⁄ecting both economies, monetary
shocks are smaller in the Euro area: the estimated mean value of monetary
23In the case of models without ￿nancial frictions, introducing variable capital utilization
decreases the marginal data density. This result is in line with Adolfson, LasØn, LindØ, and
Villani (2004), who ￿nd that a model without variable capital utilization delivers a higher
marginal density for European data.
24shocks is 145 basic points (annual) in the U.S., but only 92 basic points in
the Euro area. This di⁄erence in monetary policy shocks among the U.S. and
the Euro area have also been documented in Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon, and
Terlizzese (2003), Peerman and Smets (2001) and Smets and Wouters (2004).
Another di⁄erence is that preference shocks are larger in the Euro area, while
wage mark up shocks are smaller. When it comes to persistence, while technol-
ogy shocks are slightly more persistent in the Euro area, government spending
shocks are less persistent.
The mean of risk aversion in the Euro area is 1.2, which is higher than
in the U.S. On the other hand, the parameter of consumption habit formation
is smaller in the Euro area, and around 0.50.
Concerning price stickiness, prices adjust every six quarters on average.
This implies that prices are more sticky in the Euro area, consistent with Peer-
man and Smets (2001), who ￿nd that the impact on prices after a monetary
shock is faster in the U.S. Moreover, wage behavior is very similar to the U.S.:
wages change every four months on average.
The elasticity of the price of capital with respect to the investment capital
ratio, ’, is larger in Europe, with a mean value of -0.97. Given larger monitoring
costs in the Euro area, the model requires higher adjustment costs in investment
to dampen the response of investment after a shock. In the model, these two
e⁄ects o⁄set each other and investment responds similarly in the U.S. and the
Euro area.
The coe¢ cients in the monetary rule are similar in both areas, and dif-
ferent from the prior, suggesting that both areas have responded in a similar
way to expected in￿ ation and output in the last twenty years.
In Figure 7, I plot the actual and one-side Kalman ￿lter ￿tted data of the
benchmark model with and without monitoring costs. The ￿gure shows that
the model with a ￿nancial accelerator slightly better represents the actual data.
5 Discussion
The results show that frictions in ￿nancial markets are important in the
U.S. and the Euro area. Moreover, the size of these frictions is larger in the case
of the Euro area. This is in line with independent observations suggesting that
￿nancial markets are more developed and integrated in the U.S., and that the
institutional and legal framework in the two areas di⁄er. For example, Danthine,
Giavazzi, Vives, and von Thadden (1999) argue that the legal di⁄erences among
European countries, and the lack of a ￿ European corporate law￿ , constitute
an additional factor of market segmentation. These authors claim that the
25European ￿nancial framework is not harmonized when it comes to law, taxation,
and supervisory and regulatory institutions. Evidently, such discrepancies can
easily translate into a less e¢ cient credit market.
Moreover, the U.S. has a more fragmented banking sector than the Euro
area and a larger number of publicly listed ￿rms ￿ per capita￿ , which may also
imply a more transparent and competitive market.
A number of studies have documented these kinds of di⁄erences in ￿nan-
cial markets on the two sides of the Atlantic. Table 4 shows the Thomson rating
to be lower in the U.S., meaning a more e¢ cient banking system. Moreover,
while the return on assets is higher in the U.S., loan losses are lower, which is
consistent with the results obtained in my estimation. Table 8 shows loan losses
to be 0.10 and 0.32 percent in the U.S. and the Euro area, respectively. In the
model, these numbers are identi￿ed by monitoring costs: the posterior mean of
monitoring costs is 12 percent in the U.S. and 18 percent in the Euro area for
the benchmark model.
The ￿nancial market structure can play an important role in the trans-
mission mechanism of shocks and the decisions of ￿rms. The fact that the Euro
area presents more frictions in credit markets than the U.S. might generate dif-
ferent dynamics of investment. For example, with the rest of the parameters
being equal, a model with larger monitoring costs has a greater response in
investment to a monetary policy shock.
Figure 9 and 10 plot the impulse response function to a one standard
deviation monetary shock of the benchmark model, with and without monitor-
ing costs, in each of the two areas. In the absence of monitoring costs, both
in￿ ation and investment react much less to the shock. To facilitate comparison,
Figure 11 shows the impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock of
equal size in both economies, evaluated at the posterior mean for the benchmark
model. Even though monitoring costs are larger in the Euro area, the response
of investment is similar in both economies. In the model, this is due to higher
investment adjustment costs in the Euro area, which o⁄set the larger credit
frictions. In that sense, frictions in credit markets are not a good explanation
for the ￿ output composition puzzle￿described in Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon,
and Terlizzese (2003). These authors ￿nd that while the response patterns to
a monetary policy shock are similar in the U.S. and the Euro area, there is a
noticeable di⁄erence in the composition of output changes. In the U.S., con-
sumption is the predominant driver of output changes after a monetary shock,
while in the Euro area it is investment. Figure 11 shows that even though there
exist higher ￿nancial frictions in the Euro area, this does not imply a di⁄erent
response of output, investment or consumption after a monetary policy shock.
Figure 11 also shows that higher monitoring costs imply a di⁄erent prop-
26agation mechanism of in￿ ation, real wages and the external risk premium. To
check that this is not caused by other parameters in the model, I perform a
counterfactual analysis. In Figure 12, I plot the impulse response function to
a monetary policy shock of the estimated model for the U.S. (evaluated at the
mean of the posterior) and the same exercise only changing the value of three
parameters: monitoring costs, steady state risk premium and investment ad-
justment costs. I set these three parameters equal to their mean estimates for
the Euro area. The ￿gure suggests that larger monitoring costs in Europe are
not related to a di⁄erent transmission mechanism of investment. Moreover, the
existence of higher monitoring costs implies a higher response of the costs of
funds in the Euro area.
6 Conclusions
I study an extended version of the BGG model augmented with other
frictions, such as price indexation to past in￿ ation, sticky wages, consumption
habits and variable capital utilization. This model is estimated using Bayesian
techniques for both the U.S. and the Euro area.
The results indicate that ￿nancial frictions are relevant in both areas, but
quantitative more important in the Euro area. This suggests that the ￿nancial
market structure can play an important role in the transmission mechanism of
shocks and the decisions of ￿rms. The fact that the Euro area presents more
frictions in credit markets might be considered to generate di⁄erent dynamics
in investment as compared to the U.S. In actual fact, however, the response
of investment is similar in both economies. In the model, this is due to higher
investment adjustment costs in the Euro area, which o⁄set the larger credit fric-
tions. Higher ￿nancial frictions in the Euro area do generate di⁄erent responses
of prices, wages and the external risk premium, though.
Future research should investigate the robustness of these results to alter-
native ways of specifying ￿nancial frictions. The ￿nancial accelerator mechanism
is certainly a popular device to account for informational frictions in ￿nancial
markets, but not the only one.
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30A Optimal Contract
As in BGG, the return on capital depends both on aggregate and idio-
syncratic shocks. The ex post return on capital in state s of the economy is
!i
t+1rk
s;t+1, where !i is an i:i:d. lognormal random variable with pdf F(!) and
mean one.
Entrepreneurs ￿nance their capital stock at the end of period t with their





where qt is the relative price of capital at the end of the period. As in BGG,
the entrepreneur borrows from a ￿nancial intermediary that obtains its funds
from households, with an opportunity cost equal to the riskless gross rate of
return, rt. Following a "costly state veri￿cation" problem of the type analyzed
by Townsend (1979), lenders must pay a ￿xed "auditing cost" to observe an
individual borrower￿ s realized return. BGG assume monitoring costs to be a





The optimal contract will be characterized by a schedule of state con-
tingent threshold values of the idiosyncratic shock $i
s;t+1, such that for values
of the idiosyncratic shock greater than the threshold, the entrepreneur can re-
pay the lender, and for values below, the entrepreneur declares default and the
lender gets (1 ￿ ￿)!i
t+1rk
s;t+1qte ki
t+1: Because the entrepreneur is risk neutral,
he is willing to guarantee the lender a return free of any aggregate risk.
Under these assumptions, the optimal contract is chosen to maximize
expected entrepreneurial utility conditional on the return of the lender, for each
possible realization of rk
t+1, being equal in expected value to the riskless rate,















































s;t+1) is the expected gross share of pro￿ts going to the lender given state





























































































Since all entrepreneurs have the same distribution of the idiosyncratic
risk, $i
s;t+1 = $s;t+1 and ￿s($i







will also be the same across entrepreneurs.
From the second FOC, we see that when ￿ = 0;￿($t+1) = 1 and Etrk
t+1 =
rt. The third FOC is related to the fact that bank pro￿ts are zero ex post. In
this case, the lender￿ s expected return can simply be expressed as a function of
the average cuto⁄ value of the ￿rm￿ s idiosyncratic shock, $t+1.
BGG show the capital to wealth ratio to be an increasing function of the
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